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that tied together key liege vassals, noble 
families, and daimyo. Moreover, wealthy 
merchants and other commoners who lent 
money to the shogunate submitted memori-
als regarding, for example, how to reform 
shOgunal finances. Gradually the shOgunate 
allowed input from outer daimyo and court 
nobles, thus weakening its position as the 
ruling institution in Japan. 
Michael Wert 
See also: Buke Shohatto; Civil Wars, Sengoku 
Era; Ii Naosuke; Muromachi Bakufu; Toku-
gawa Ieyasu; Tokugawa Nariaki. 
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Tokugawa Bakumatsu Military 
Reforms 
By the 19th century, leaders within the 
shogunate, and daimyo throughout Japan, 
bemoaned the backward state conditions of 
their military organization and technology, 
and complained about the deteriorating 
state of the samurai class as a reliable pool 
of skilled warrior-bureaucrats capable of 
maintaining stability in Japan. The shOgu-
nate's solution was to streamline its military 
organization, eliminate inefficiency, provide 
new sources of military technology from 
Western countries, and reinvigorate samurai 
physical and moral training. The first 
reforms were brief, occurring in 1854, the 
year that treaties were signed with the 
United States. They consisted of cost 
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cutting, expanding coastal defenses, and 
encouraging military drills and frugality 
among the samurai. Domains carried out 
these reforms as they saw fit-for example, 
increasing the number of schools available 
for samurai learning and martial arts. The 
reform did little to change the Tokugawa 
military, however, as other domestic con-
cerns attracted the shogunate's attention-
major reform would have to wait until the 
1860s. 
The most expansive institutional military 
changes occurred as one part of a broad 
effort called the "Bunkyu Reforms" of 
1862. These reforms included a shifting of 
the political relationship between the sho-
gunate and the court, whereby the shogunate 
recognized itself as subordinate to the 
emperor, and institutional reforms such as 
the weakening of the alternate attendance 
system (sankin kotai). On the military 
front, the shogunate increased purchases of 
Western weaponry, like the newly invented 
Minie rifle, which possessed greater range 
and accuracy than previously available 
rifles. The shogunate encouraged domains 
to buy warships, and even sent men abroad 
for training. It also established firing ranges. 
Other reforms included a complete reorgani-
zation of the military structure, using a 
Dutch model of "tactics of three combat 
arms," which employed light infantry 
armed with Minie rifles, artillery units, and 
heavy and light cavalry. Taking advantage 
of its close relationship to France, the shO-
gunate invited several military advising mis-
sions to Japan. From the mid-1860s and 
throughout the early Meiji period, French 
drill and military science continued to influ-
ence the modern Japanese military. This 
included a French-led construction of an 
arsenal, dockyard, and iron works at Yoko-
suka, with plans to build a shipyard that 
would buttress the shogunate's navy. 
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However, traditional weaponry, such as 
units of pike-wielding samurai, remained. 
The shogunate also redefined its retainers' 
roles. On the one hand, it no longer required 
the lowest-ranking men to support the army 
with their labor, but instead asked them to 
pay a tax on their stipend-an attempt to 
accrue more funds for reforms. On the 
other hand, fief-holding bannermen were 
asked to send men from their fiefs to Edo 
and elsewhere for training. 
Reforms did not happen at once, but were 
implemented in piecemeal fashion through-
out the 1860s. Many of the reforms changed 
over time-for example, even units consist-
ing of fief-holding bannermen were eventu-
ally disbanded and their military duties 
converted into tax obligations. Large 
domains also carried out similar reforms, 
especially the Satsuma domain, which relied 
on the British for new weapons and war-
ships. Moreover, the shOgunate and domains 
included more commoners in their militar-
ies. ShOgunate offices throughout the Kanto 
regions, such as the Iwahana intendent sta-
tion in Kozuke Province, ordered local peas-
ant elites to form militias. These militias, 
and their counterparts in domains such as 
Choshu, were burdensome for peasant popu-
laces who had to provide their manpower 
and funding. At the same time, the peasant 
militias allowed young peasants from elite 
families to build upon their swordsmanship 
training, presenting them with an opportu-
nity to act out fantasies of being a warrior. 
In at least one domain, a popular fencing 
instructor who was a commoner was hired 
to teach his "realistic" style to the domain's 
samurai, as part of the daimyo's effort to 
remilitarize them. 
For the shogunate, the military reforms 
were too little, too late. It lacked the funds 
to buy the full range of weapons and training 
it needed. Moreover, many high-ranking 
samurai resisted the reforms. For example, 
they did not want to pay the new obligatory 
taxes or train with Western rifles, an activity 
more suitable to low-ranking men or com-
moners. Nevertheless, many of these 
reforms influenced the military development 
during the Meiji period, especially the use of 
commoners in the army instead of samurai. 
In addition, the Meiji government continued 
to support the French-constructed Yokosuka 
naval base, and used French models for 
infantry. 
Michael Wert 
See also: Bakumatsu Fencing Schools and 
Nationalism; Navy, Modernized; Rise of the 
Modem Army; Sankin kotai (Alternate Atten-
dance); Tokugawa Bakufu Political System; 
Tokugawa Economic Reforms. 
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Tokugawa leyasu (1543-1616) 
Tokugawa Ieyasu was born Matsudaira 
Takechiyo on January 31, 1543, near 
Nagoya; he was the son of the daimyo 
Matsudaira Hirotada. Seeking to expand his 
lands from the mountains onto the plains of 
Mikawa, Hirotada made an alliance with 
the neighboring Imagawa clan and sent his 
six-year-old son to live with the Imagawa 
as a hostage. There, Ieyasu learned military 
and administrative skills and even led forces 
